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Abstract We consider a multi-person stopping game with players’ priorities and
multiple stopping. Players observe sequential offers at random or fixed times. Each
accepted offer results in a reward. Each player can obtain fixed number of rewards.
If more than one player wants to accept an offer, then the player with the highest
priority among them obtains it. The aim of each player is to maximize the expected
total reward. For the game defined this way, we construct a Nash equilibrium. The
construction is based on the solution of an optimal multiple stopping problem. We
show the connections between expected rewards and stopping times of the players in
Nash equilibrium in the game and the optimal expected rewards and optimal stopping
times in the multiple stopping problem. A Pareto optimum of the game is given.
It is also proved that the presented Nash equilibrium is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium payoffs are unique. We also present new
results related to multiple stopping problem.
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Multi-person stopping games with players’ priorities have been investigated by many
authors. The reason for it is diversity of applications of considered models which fit
very well the problems present in economic theory and operations research (see, e.g.,
Heller 2012). This paper has two main contributions with respect to this domain of
research. The first contribution is a consideration of a game where players can stop
more than once, i.e., Player i can stop ni ≥ 1 times (in the literature, it is usually
assumed that each player can stop once, but such assumption is not always realistic).
The second contribution is providing a construction of Nash equilibrium for this game
based on a solution of a multiple stopping problem. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium
is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and at the same time it is a Pareto-optimum
of the game. We also prove that Nash equilibrium payoffs are unique.
To motivate the study of games with mentioned properties, consider the following
two examples. In the first example, m shops sell commodities of the same type and all
the shops are situated in a shopping center. The i th shop has ni commodities for sale.
The shops are ordered according to their distance to the main entrance of the shopping
center; the ordering is referred to as priority, so that 1 refers to the shop which is the
closest to the entrance and m to the shop which is the farthest from the entrance. The
market brings about a sequence of buying offers. A potential buyer always goes to
the closest shop first and presents his offer. If the offer is accepted, the transaction is
realized; if the offer is not accepted, the buyer goes to the second-closest shop etc.
The aim of each shop is to maximize the expected total reward (profit).
Let us consider another example—one that will model assigning tasks in a com-
puter cluster. Clusters execute computations in a distributed way, because of that, the
computations take only a fraction of the time that would be used if they were executed
on a single computer. They are a standard tool for advanced scientific calculations as
well as for processing large amounts of data in enterprises. Assume that we have a
cluster that consists of m computers. We want to build a computer system that assigns
tasks to computers in the cluster. Each task is associated with an estimation of com-
puting power needed to execute this task. Furthermore, each computer in the cluster
has a certain computing power (this corresponds to its priority among the computers).
The goal of the system is to assign the task to appropriate computer in the cluster or to
decide that the task will be executed locally (i.e., on a computer that does not belong
to the cluster; in our model we say that such task is “rejected”). We assume that each
computer in the cluster can execute a limited number of tasks (because using them is
time-consuming and costly). Therefore we need to find an optimal strategy on which
the system will be based. The strategy (and consequently the system) should allow
to maximize the expected amount of executed computation on each of computers
separately in the cluster.
The mentioned examples motivated us to consider multi-person stopping games
characterized by players’ priorities andmultiple stopping. A special case of the consid-
ered game has been presented in Ferenstein and Krasnosielska (2009), Krasnosielska
(2011), andKrasnosielska-Kobos andFerenstein (2013). Inmentionedpapers, in oppo-
site to this paper, authors considered a game with the same rewards’ structure as in
the Elfving problem [see Elfving (1967) and Siegmund (1967)], under the assump-
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tion that each player has only one commodity for sale. More precisely, they assumed
that the offers are independent identically distributed random variables observed at
jump times of a Poisson process and the reward is equal to the value of a discounted
offer. Moreover, in mentioned papers, in opposite to this paper, authors search for
Nash equilibrium in a specific set of strategies, i.e. strategies where if players haven’t
sold their commodities until a certain point in time, then they have to accept the first
available offer after this time. The mentioned point in time is the optimal stopping
time of selling last commodity in multiple selling problem in which the number of
commodities is equal to the sum of all commodities of all players. Various games with
rewards observed at jump times of a Poisson process with at most one stop for each
player were considered in Dixon (1993) and Saario and Sakaguchi (1992), among
others. Two-person game with finite horizon where players observe a Markov process
and one of the players can accept two offers was investigated in Szajowski (2002).
A game with continuous time where players have possibility to stop more than once
was presented in Laraki and Solan (2005). An extensive bibliography on games can
be found in Ekström and Peskir (2008), Nowak and Szajowski (1999), Peskir (2008),
Ramsey and Szajowski (2008) and Solan and Vieille (2003).
General theorems on existence and form of solution of a multiple stopping problem
were presented in Stadje (1985), Nikolaev (1999) and Kösters (2004). A multiple
stopping problem with random horizon was analyzed in Krasnosielska-Kobos (2015).
A multiple stopping problem based on the Elfving problem was presented in Stadje
(1987) and a version without discounting in Sakaguchi (1972).
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the multiple stopping problem.
The game is formulated in Sect. 3 along with a construction of Nash equilibrium and
its properties. Examples are analyzed in Sect. 4.
The idea of using the solution of a multiple stopping problem to construct a Nash
equilibrium is based onKrasnosielska (2011) andKrasnosielska-Kobos andFerenstein
(2013).
2 Multiple stopping problem
In this section we will present a multiple stopping problem formulated and solved in
Stadje (1985) with modifications proposed in Kösters (2004). Next we will introduce
new results concerning multiple stopping problems (Proposition 1, Lemmas 1 and 2
and Theorem 3).
Let (,F , P) be a probability space and {F j }∞j=0 be a nondecreasing sequence of
the σ -algebra F . Moreover, let G j be F j -measurable and integrable random variable,
j ∈ N. We define an n-stopping time with respect to {F j }∞j=0 to be a sequence
(t1, . . . , tn)ofn stopping timeswith respect to {F j }∞j=0 such that t1 < · · · < tn < +∞.
Let Mk(n) be a set of all n-stopping times (t1, . . . , tn) with respect to {F j }∞j=0 such
that t1 ≥ k and E(Gt1 +· · ·+Gtn ) exists. Our aim is to find an optimal n-stopping time
for {G j }∞j=1, that is, an n-stopping time (τ 1,n1 , . . . , τ n,n1 ) ∈ M1(n) that maximizes





+ · · · + Gτ n,n1 ).
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The presented problem can be interpreted as follows. n commodities are sold, where
the offers are received sequentially and must be refused or accepted immediately on
arrival. Acceptance of the j th offer results in the reward G j . The aim of the seller is
to maximize the expected sum of n rewards.
Let Sik be the optimal conditional expected total reward obtained from selling i
commodities when the sale of these commodities begins at the time of observation of
the kth offer, this means
Sik = ess sup
(t1,...,ti )∈Mk (i)
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gti | Fk), k ∈ N.
Moreover, let γ ik , k ∈ N0, where N0 = N ∪ {0}, be the optimal conditional expected
reward from selling the additional commodity if we have i instead of i−1 commodities
for sale at the time of the kth offer. This means
γ ik = E(Sik+1 | Fk) − E(Si−1k+1 | Fk), (1)
where S0k+1 = 0. Note that γ ik is a threshold below which it is not profitable to sell the
first commodity among i commodities for sale at the time of observation of the kth
offer. For k ∈ N define
τ i (k) = inf
{
j ≥ k : G j ≥ γ ij
}
,
and τ i (+∞) = +∞. Let τ i,nk , k ∈ N ∪ {+∞}, be the time of selling the i th commodity
from n commodities for salewhen the process of selling starts at the time of observation





τ n(k), i = 1,
τ n−(i−1)(τ i−1,nk + 1), i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
(2)
Note that τ i,nk is the first time after the time of selling i − 1th commodity among n
commodities for sale when the reward is not smaller than the threshold γ n−(i−1)k . This
means, at the stopping time τ i,nk the obtained reward is not smaller than the optimal
conditional expected reward from selling the additional commodity if we have n−i+1
instead of n − i commodities for sale.















(i i) (τ 1,nk , . . . , τ
n,n
k ) is finite with probability one for all k ∈ N.
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The first condition above ensures the existence of all considered expectations. Other
such conditions are presented in Nikolaev (1999) and Kösters (2004).
In Theorem 2 below the solution of the multiple stopping problem is given.
Theorem 2 (Stadje 1985; Kösters 2004) (τ 1,n1 , . . . , τ
n,n
1 ) is an optimal n-stopping





+ · · · + Gτ n,n1 ) = E(γ
1








+ · · · + Gτ n,nk | Fk
)
= Snk , k ∈ N.
In Stadje (1987), it is proved that in optimal stopping problem with Poisson stream
of i.i.d. offers, the functions γ ij are non-increasing with respect to i . In Proposition 1,
we will show that this property holds not only in the mentioned case. This property
can be interpreted as follows. The larger the number of commodities a seller is left
with, the more he is inclined to sell it for a lower price.
Proposition 1 For each j ∈ N0 and given n we have γ 1j ≥ · · · ≥ γ nj .
Proof It is enough to show that S2j+1 ≤ 2S1j+1 and Si+1j+1 + Si−1j+1 ≤ 2Sij+1 for i =
2, . . . , n − 1. First equation is obvious. To prove the second one, define τ˜ 1j+1 ≤ · · · ≤
τ˜ 2ij+1 such that {τ˜ 1j+1, . . . , τ˜ 2ij+1} = {τ 1,i−1j+1 , . . . , τ i−1,i−1j+1 , τ 1,i+1j+1 , . . . , τ i+1,i+1j+1 },
τ˜ 1j+1 < τ˜ 3j+1 < · · · < τ˜ 2i−1j+1 and τ˜ 2j+1 < τ˜ 4j+1 < · · · < τ˜ 2ij+1. Note that
(τ˜ 1j+1, τ˜ 3j+1, . . . , τ˜
2i−1
j+1 ) and (τ˜ 2j+1, τ˜ 4j+1, . . . , τ˜
2i
j+1) are two i-stopping times. Hence





























It is convenient to allow for some of t1, . . . , tn to take the value ∞ with positive
probability. Therefore, the following notation will be used. Let t1  t2 mean that
t1 < t2 on {t1 < ∞} and t1 = t2 on {t1 = ∞}. We define an extended n-stopping
time with respect to {F j }∞j=0 to be a sequence (t1, . . . , tn) of n extended stopping
times with respect to {F j }∞j=0 such that t1  t2  · · ·  tn . Note that an extended
stopping time t is a stopping time if t < ∞. Let M¯k(n) be the set of all extended
n-stopping times (t1, . . . , tn) such that t1 ≥ k and E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn ) exists. Define
G∞ = lim supk→∞ Gk ,
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S¯nk = ess sup
(t1,...,tn)∈M¯k (n)
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn | Fk), k ∈ N,
Sn∞ = lim sup
k→∞
Snk , S¯
n∞ = lim sup
k→∞
S¯nk .
The lemma below is a generalization of Lemma 4.10 from Chow et al. (1971) to
the case of multiple stopping.
Lemma 1 S¯n∞ = Sn∞ = n · G∞.
Proof For n = 1 the proof follows from Chow et al. (1971, Lemma 4.10 and Theorem
4.7). Assume that the lemma holds for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. We will show that it holds
for j = n. Note that
Gk + Sn−1k+1 ≤ Snk ≤ S¯nk ≤ nS¯1k = nS1k ,
where the last equality follows from Chow et al. (1971, Theorem 4.7). We get the
assertion from induction assumption. unionsq
Theorem 3 For all n ∈ N and k ∈ N we have
S¯nk = Snk , (3)
sup
(t1,...,tn)∈M¯k (n)
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn ) = sup
(t1,...,tn)∈Mk (n)
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn ). (4)
Proof The theorem is true for n = 1 (see Chow et al. 1971, Thm 4.7). Assume that
the theorem is true for n − 1. We will prove it for n. Let (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ M¯k(n). From
the fact that Ft1+1 is a σ -field, Lemma 1, and the induction assumption, we get
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn | Fk) = E(Gt1 | Fk) + E(E(Gt2 + · · · + Gtn | Ft1+1) | Fk)
≤ E(Gt1 + S¯n−1t1+1 | Fk) = E(Gt1 + Sn−1t1+1 | Fk)
≤ ess sup
t∈M¯k(1)
E(Gt + Sn−1t+1 | Fk)
= ess sup
t∈Mk (1)





Gt + Gτ 1,n−1t+1 + · · · + Gτ n−1,n−1t+1 | Fk
)
≤ Snk ,
where we used Theorem 4.7 from Chow et al. (1971) and Theorem 2. Since the above
inequality is true for all (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ M¯k(n), we get S¯nk ≤ Snk . The inverse inequality
is obvious, hence we get (3). The proof of (4) is similar to the one above. unionsq
Note that from (4), we get that (τ 1,11 , . . . , τ
n,n
1 ) is optimal in M¯1(n). Moreover,
replacing all sets of extended stopping times by sets of stopping times in the proof of
Theorem 3, we get



















These two equalities were mentioned and used in Stadje (1985) and discussed in
Kösters (2004) (in both paperswithout proof). From (5) and (6), we get that to solve the
n-stopping problem we can solve n one-stopping problems with a modified structure
of rewards.
The lemma below is a generalization of the result of Krasnosielska-Kobos and
Ferenstein (2013, Lemma 9) to the case of extended stopping times. The following
notation will be needed. Let t1  t2 mean that t1 = t2 = ∞ on {t1 = ∞, t2 = ∞}
and t1 
= t2 on {t1 < ∞ or t2 < ∞}.
Lemma 2 For each n, k ∈ N we have
sup
(t1,...,tn)∈M¯k (n)
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn ) = sup
t1,...,tn∈M¯k (1)
tit j ,i 
= j
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn )
and
S¯nk = ess sup
t1,...,tn∈M¯k (1)
tit j ,i 
= j
E(Gt1 + · · · + Gtn | Fk).
Proof Note that M¯k(n) ⊆ {(t1, . . . , tn) : t1, . . . , tn ∈ M¯k(1), ti  t j , i 
= j}. Let
t1, . . . , tn ∈ M¯k(1) be any extended stopping times such that ti  t j for i 
= j .
Define t(1) = min{t1, . . . , tn}, t(i+1) = min{t j : t j  t(i), j ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. Then,
(t(1), . . . , t(n)) ∈ M¯k(n). unionsq
3 The game
In this section,wewill formulate the game and aNash equilibrium.Wewill also present
its properties. The game is a generalization of the one presented in Krasnosielska
(2011) and Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein (2013).
Suppose that there are m > 1 ordered players. Player 1 has the highest priority
and Player m has the lowest one. Players observe sequential rewards {Gn}. Player i is
allowed to obtain ni rewards. The decision about acceptance or rejection of the reward
must be made at the time of its appearance. Player i who has just decided to select Gn ,
gets this reward if and only if he has obtained at most ni − 1 rewards so far and there
is no player with higher priority who has also decided to take this reward. As soon as
Player i gets ni rewards, he quits the game. All the players follow this scenario. The




3.1 Model of the game
Let us formulate the game formally. We make the same assumptions and use the same
notations as in Sect. 2. Moreover, let D be the set of sequences of 0–1-valued {Fn}-
adapted random variables. Let ψm,i = {ψm,in }n∈N ∈ D be a strategy of Player i in
the m-person game. If ψm,in = 1, then, at the time of observation of the nth offer, the
decision of Player i is: I accept the reward Gn . Otherwise, his decision is: I reject the
reward Gn .
Let us explain why we can assume that ψm,i ∈ D for each i . Decisions of Player
1 do not depend on decisions of other players because of his priority. Therefore,
his decision concerning acceptance of the reward Gn is a Borel function of Fn-
measurable random variables, so his decision is also a 0–1-valued Fn-measurable
random variable. This random variable is denoted by ψm,1n . Hence, ψm,1 ∈ D.
Player 2 makes the decision based on observations belonging to Fn and sequence
of decisions of Player 1 until this time because of players’ priorities. Hence, the
decision of Player 2 concerning acceptance of the reward Gn is a 0–1-valued func-
tion of Fn-measurable random variables and sequence {ψm,1l }nl=1, where the random
variables ψm,11 , . . . , ψ
m,1
n are Fn-measurable. Hence, the decision of Player 2 con-
cerning acceptance of the reward Gn is a 0–1-valued Fn-measurable random variable
which is denoted by ψm,2n . Therefore, ψm,2 ∈ D. Analogically, we have that the
decision ψm,in of Player i concerning acceptance of the reward Gn is 0–1-valued Fn-
measurable random variable. Therefore, the decisions of players are sequences form
D. The relation between players’ decisions in Nash equilibrium will be illustrated in
Example 1.
We say that ψm is the profile of the m-person game if ψm = (ψm,1, . . . , ψm,m),
where ψm,i ∈ D for i ≤ m. Let σ i,lm (ψm) be the time of selling the lth commodity by
Player i in them-person gamewith the strategy profileψm . Note that on {σ i,l−1m (ψm) <
∞}wehave thatσ i,lm (ψm) is the first time after the time of selling the l−1th commodity
by Player i in them-person game such that Player i wants to sell the commodity at this
time and there is no player with higher priority who also wants to sell his commodity at
this time. Formally, we define σ i,lm (ψm), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, l ∈ {1, . . . , ni }, recursively






n > σ 1,l−1m (ψm) : ψm,1n = 1
}
,






n > σ i,l−1m (ψm) : ψm,in = 1, σ j,l jm (ψm) 
= n, j ≤ i − 1, l j ≤ n j
}
∞ if no such n exists.
(7)
On {σ i,l−1m (ψm) = ∞} we set σ i,km (ψm) = ∞ for k = l, . . . , ni . Note that if i1 
= i2
or l1 
= l2, then σ i1,l1m (ψm) 
= σ i2,l2m (ψm) on {σ i1,l1m (ψm) < ∞ or σ i2,l2m (ψm) < ∞}.











and the expected total reward is
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m) = ∞ for l = k + 1, . . . , ni . Note that the expected reward of Player i does
not change whether he sells a commodity at ∞ or not.
Denote Dm = D × · · · × D︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
. Let us recall, that the strategy profile ϕm is a Nash
equilibrium in Dm if ϕm ∈ Dm and it is not profitable for any of the players to change
only his own strategy, assuming that all players know the equilibrium strategies of
other players. In other words, ϕm is a Nash equilibrium if for any profile ψm ∈ Dm
Vm,i (ϕ
m) ≥ Vm,i ((ϕm)−i , ψm,i ) for i = 1, . . . ,m,
where ((ϕm)−i , ψm,i ) = (ϕm,1, . . . , ϕm,i−1, ψm,i , ϕm,i+1, . . . , ϕm,m).
Wewant to find aNash equilibrium in the set Dm for them-person game formulated
above.
Discussion The problem can also be formulated as follows. Player 1 has to solve
multiple stopping problem and stop at optimal stopping times τ 1,n11 , . . . , τ
n1,n1
1 pre-
sented in Sect. 2. Player 2 also faces a standard multiple stopping problem but
with modified reward structure, i.e., his reward G2j is equal to G j except for stop-
ping times τ 1,n11 , . . . , τ
n1,n1
1 in which G
2
j is equal to Hj , where for example, Hj =
E(min{G j , . . . ,G j+Nm } | F j ) − 1. Analogically, reward G3j of Player 3 is equal to
G2j except when Player 2 stops (equivalently G
3
j is equal to G j except when Player 1
or Player 2 stop). In stopping times of Player 2, we haveG3j = Hj , etc. In other words,
Player 2 will stop at the stopping times that belong to the set {τ 1,N21 , . . . , τ N2,N21 } and
don’t belong to the set of stopping times of Player 1. This is ensured by the modifica-
tion of the reward structure: i.e. it is not profitable to accept reward Hj because there
are at least Nm better offers to come. Consequently, the rewards accepted by Player
1 are ignored by players with lower priorities. Analogically, Player 3 will stop at the
stopping times that belong to the set {τ 1,N31 , . . . , τ N3,N31 } and don’t belong to the set
of stopping times of Players 1 and 2. The idea of using modified structure rewards
similar to the one above will be used in the proof of Theorem 7.
3.2 Construction of Nash equilibrium
Let us present the construction of a Nash equilibrium. Denote N0 = 0 and Nl =
n1 + · · · + nl for l ≤ m. For k ∈ N ∪ {+∞} and i ∈ {1, . . . , Nm}, define
σ k1 = τ 1(k), (9)
σ ki =
{
τ i (k) if τ i−1(k) > τ i (k),
σ
τ i (k)+1
i−1 if τ i−1(k) = τ i (k),
(10)
where σ+∞i = +∞. Note that on {τ i (k) = ∞}, we have σ ki = ∞.
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Note that from Proposition 1 for each k, we get τ n(k) ≤ · · · ≤ τ 1(k). Hence, σ ki
are well-defined. Moreover, similarly as in Krasnosielska (2011), and Krasnosielska-
Kobos and Ferenstein (2013), from Assumption 1(i i), it can be shown that for each
k ∈ N and i ≤ Nm, σ ki is the stopping time with respect to {F j }∞j=0 such that
σ ki ≤ τ Nm ,Nmk < ∞. Similarly, we have that σ ki 
= σ kj for i 
= j , and for l, k ∈ N
{













Note that σ 11 is an optimal stopping time in a single stopping problem, σ
1
2 is an
optimal stopping time in two-stopping problem different than σ 11 . Thus we have that
σ 12 ∈ {τ 1,21 , τ 2,21 } and σ 12 
= τ 1,11 . Analogically, σ 13 is an optimal stopping time in
three-stopping problem different than σ 12 and σ
1
1 , etc. So σ
1
3 ∈ {τ 1,31 , τ 2,31 , τ 3,31 } and
σ 13 /∈ {τ 1,11 , τ 1,21 , τ 2,21 } = {τ 1,21 , τ 2,21 }.





σ 1Ni−1+1 = k
)
+ · · · + I
(
σ 1Ni = k
)
, (12)
where I(A) is the indicator function of the event A. From definition of σ 1k we get
that {ψˆ l,in } is a sequence of 0–1-valued {F j }-adapted random variables and ψˆ l,i ∈ D.
Note that the profile ψˆ l is a natural candidate for a Nash equilibrium. According to the
strategy profile above, Player i in the l-person game will make the same decisions as
Player i in the i-person game (under the assumption that the number of commodities
that Player j , j = 1, . . . , i , has for sale is equal in both games), that is, ψˆ l,i = ψˆ i,i .
















σ 1Ni−1+ j : σ 1Ni−1+ j > σ i,k−1l (ψˆ l), 1 ≤ j ≤ ni
}
, 2 ≤ k ≤ ni .

















Hence for i ≤ l we have σ i, jl (ψˆ l) = σ i, ji (ψˆ i ), that is, Player i in the l-person game
will sell his j th commodity at the time of selling the j th commodity by Player i in the
i-person game. Consequently,
Vl,i (ψˆ
l) = Vi,i (ψˆ i ). (14)
Note that in accordance with (14), the expected total reward of Player i in the l-person
game with the strategy profile ψˆ l is equal to the expected total reward of Player i in
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the i-person game with the strategy profile ψˆ i (under the assumption that the number
of commodities that Player j, j = 1, . . . , i , has for sale is equal in both games).
Moreover, according to (7), the decision of Player i does not influence the decisions of
players with higher priority. Therefore, the existence of Nash equilibrium is intuitively
clear.








E(Gt j ). (15)
Proof Using (8), (13), (11) and Theorem 2 we get (15). unionsq
Theorem 4 The profile ψˆm is a Nash equilibrium in Dm.
Proof Considerations similar to those in Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein (2013,
Theorem 4) and Lemma 2, Theorem 3, Lemma 3 and (14) give the assertion. unionsq
3.3 Properties of the constructed Nash equilibrium
In this section, we will prove some properties of the Nash equilibrium.
Let us recall that the strategy profile ϕm ∈ Dm is Pareto-optimal, if it is impossible
to make any player to be better off without making at least one player to be worse off.
In other words, there does not exist a profileψm ∈ Dm such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Vm,i (ψ
m) ≥ Vm,i (ϕm)
and at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Theorem 5 The profile ψˆm ∈ Dm is Pareto-optimal in Dm.
Proof Considerations similar to those in Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein (2013,
Theorem 5) and Theorem 3 and Lemmas 2 and 3 give the assertion. unionsq
We will show that the constructed strategy profile ψˆ is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium, that is, after any history, all remaining players’ strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium in the remaining part of the game.
Let V km,i (ψ
m) be the conditional expected reward for Player i in them-person game















Assume that we are just before the observation of the kth offer. The number of
commodities which have been sold by Player i to this time isFk−1-measurable random
variable taking values 0, 1, . . . , ni , where ni is the number of commodities for sale at
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the beginning of the game. This follows from the fact that decisions of all players made
before the observation of the kth offer areFk−1-measurable randomvariables. Assume
that the number of commoditieswhich have been sold by Player i before observation of
the kth offer is equal to n˜i . Hence, Player i has still ni − n˜i commodities for sale at the
timeof observationof the kth offer.Note that Player i hasni−n˜i commodities for sale at




k which follows from (7). Player i has finished the game before observation of the kth
offer if and only if σ i,nim (ψˆm) < k. Moreover, let N˜i = n˜1 + · · · + n˜i and τ 0,Nn1 = 0.




1 < k, τ
N˜n+1,Nn






1 < k, τ
N˜n+1,Nn
1 ≥ k, τ j,Nn−N˜nk = h
}
. (16)
Proof The proof is by induction on j . Note that for h ≥ k and j = 1 we get that the














1 = i, τ Nn−N˜n (i + 1) ≥ k,
Gk < γ
Nn−N˜n
k , . . . ,Gh−1 < γ
Nn−N˜n








1 = i, τ Nn−N˜n (i + 1) ≥ k, τ Nn−N˜n (k) = h
}
,
which is equal to the R.H.S. of (16) for j = 1. Assume that (16) is satisfied for
j −1, j ∈ {2, . . . , Nn − N˜n}. We will show that (16) holds for j . Note that the L.H.S.




1 < k, τ
N˜n+1,Nn












1 < k, τ
N˜n+1,Nn









which is equal to the R.H.S. of (16). unionsq
Theorem 6 The profile ψˆm is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof Assume that we are just about to observe of the kth offer and up to this time
l ≤ m players have remained in the game, say players numbered i1, . . . , il , and
they have sold n˜i1 , . . . , n˜il commodities respectively, where 0 ≤ n˜i j ≤ ni j − 1,
j ∈ {1, . . . , l}. Define I = {i1, . . . , il} and
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We want to prove that for n ∈ {1, . . . , l}
I(A)V km,in (ψˆ
m) ≥ I(A)V km,in ((ψˆm)−in , ψm,in ),
where the profile ψm ∈ Dm and {ψm,ij }k−1j=1 = {ψˆm,ij }k−1j=1 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Note that before the kth observation, Players i1, . . . , in sold together N˜in commodi-
ties from Nin . Hence, from Proposition 2 and (11) we have
















































t1,...,tNin −N˜in ∈M¯k (1)









V km,i j ((ψˆ
m)−in , ψm,in ),
where we used Theorem 3, Lemma 2, (11), (13), (7), and (8). Hence from observation
that V km,i j ((ψˆ
m)−in , ψm,in ) = V km,i j (ψˆm) for j ≤ n − 1 we get
I(A)V km,in (ψˆ
m) ≥ I(A)V km,in ((ψˆm)−in , ψm,in ). (17)
Since (17) holds for any l, i1, . . . , il and n˜i1 , . . . , n˜il , we get the assertion. unionsq
In Theorem 7, we will show that the Nash equilibrium payoff is unique.
Theorem 7 Let a profile ϕˆm ∈ Dm be a Nash equilibrium, then
Vm, j (ϕˆ
m) = Vm, j (ψˆm), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (18)





m) ≥ Vm,1((ϕˆm)−1, ψˆm,1) = Vm,1(ψˆm),
which results in Vm,1(ϕˆm) = Vm,1(ψˆm). Assume that (18) is satisfied for j =
















where we used Lemma 2, Theorem 3 and (15). Hence, from the induction assumption,
we get Vm,i (ϕˆm) ≤ Vm,i (ψˆm).
To finish the proof, we need to show that the inverse inequality holds. Let C be the
set of all extended stopping times of Players 1, . . . , i−1 in them-person gamewith the
profile ϕˆm .Define Hn = E(min{Gn, . . . ,Gn+Ni } | Fn)−1.Letσ ∗0 = 0.Moreover, for
l = 1, . . . , ni , let G˜ln = GnI(n /∈ C∪{σ ∗0 , . . . , σ ∗l−1})+HnI(n ∈ C∪{σ ∗0 , . . . , σ ∗l−1}),
n ≥ 1, G˜l∞ = lim supn→∞ G˜ln = G∞,
σ ∗l = inf
{





Note that σ ∗l , l ∈ {1, . . . , ni }, is the optimal extended stopping time for the sequence
{G˜ln} and σ ∗l ∈ M¯1(1). Define ψm,ik = I({σ ∗1 = k} ∪ · · · ∪ {σ ∗ni = k}). Note that
{ψm,ik } ∈ D. Since P(σ ∗l ∈ C ∪ {σ ∗0 , . . . , σ ∗l−1}, σ ∗l < ∞) = 0 for l ≥ 1, the reward
of Player i in the game with strategy ((ϕˆm)−i , ψm,i ) is equal to G˜1
σ ∗1
+ · · · + G˜niσ ∗ni .
Hence using the fact that M1(ni ) ⊆ M¯1(ni ) we get
Vm,i ((ϕˆ




) + · · · + sup
tNi ∈M1(1)





E(GtNi−1+1) + · · · + sup
tNi ∈M1(1)























Hence, from induction assumption, (15) and the result of Krasnosielska-Kobos and
Ferenstein (2013, Lemma 9) we have
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where we used the result of Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein (2013, Lemma 9).
Hence, from induction assumption, we get Vm,i (ϕˆm) ≥ Vm,i (ψˆm). unionsq
4 Examples
In this section we will present a multiple stopping problem formulated and solved in
Sakaguchi (1972) and Stadje (1987). Next, we will show how each player behaves in
accordance with the Nash equilibrium, that is, how exactly the strategy formulated in
Sect. 3 works.
Assume that Y1,Y2, . . . are nonnegative independent random variables with a dis-
tribution function F(x) = 1 − exp(x) for x ≥ 0. The random variables Y1,Y2, . . .
are sequentially observed at jump times 0 < T1 < T2 < · · · of a homogeneous
Poisson process with intensity 1 and T0 = 0. Moreover, assume that the sequences
{Yk}∞k=1 and {Tk}∞k=1 are independent. We assume that Gk = YkI(Tk ∈ [0, 10)) and
Fk = σ(Y1, . . . ,Yk, T1, . . . , Tk), k ∈ N, F0 = {∅,}. The solution of this multiple
stopping problem is given in theorems below.
Theorem 8 (Sakaguchi 1972; Stadje 1987) Random variables γ ik , i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
k ∈ N0, given in (1) are functions of one random variable Tk, say γ i (Tk), i.e., for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k ∈ N0, we have γ ik = γ i (Tk), where













Theorem 9 (Stadje 1987) (τ 1,n1 , . . . , τ
n,n
1 ), where τ
i,n
1 is given in (2) is an optimal
n-stopping time in M1(n) for the sequence {Gk}∞k=1. Moreover,
sup
(τ 1,...,τ n)∈M1(n)









Table 1 Simulation of value of the offers and times of their appearance. “T” means True and “F” means
False
k Tk Yk γ
1(Tk ) γ
2(Tk ) γ
3(Tk ) Gk ≥ γ 1(Tk ) Gk ≥ γ 2(Tk ) Gk ≥ γ 3(Tk )
1 0.23 0.16 2.38 1.69 1.3 F F F
2 2.67 1.44 2.12 1.44 1.05 F T T
3 3.24 0.06 2.05 1.37 0.99 F F F
4 3.99 2.96 1.95 1.27 0.89 T T T
5 5.83 1.73 1.64 0.99 0.63 T T T
6 5.89 0.05 1.63 0.98 0.62 F F F
7 6.36 0.06 1.53 0.89 0.54 F F F
8 6.65 2.63 1.47 0.83 0.49 T T T
9 7.02 2.3 1.38 0.75 0.42 T T T
10 8.33 0.34 0.98 0.42 0.17 F F T
11 8.84 0.97 0.77 0.27 0.09 T T T
12 9.35 1.48 0.5 0.12 0.02 T T T
13 9.56 0.52 0.36 0.07 0.01 T T T
14 9.82 3.08 0.17 0.01 0 T T T
15 10.7 – 0 0 0 T T T
Note that from (14) and Lemma 3 we have
Vm, j (ψˆ
m) = γ N j−1+1(0) + · · · + γ N j (0). (20)
Assume that we have three commodities for sale, i.e., n = 3. Then









Therefore, from (19) we have that the optimal expected reward from selling three
commodities is approximately 5.43.
Now we will show how the strategy in the Nash equilibrium works. The simulation
of value of the offers and times of their appearance are presented in Table 1.
In the situation presented in Table 1, we have τ 1(1) = 4, τ 2(1) = 2 and τ 3(1) = 2.
Moreover, τ 1,21 = τ 2(1) = 2 and τ 2,21 = τ 1(τ 2(1) + 1) = τ 1(3) = 4. Analogically,
from (2) we have τ 1,31 = 2, τ 2,31 = 4 and τ 3,31 = 5. To compute σ 13 , note that
τ 1(τ 3(1) + 1) = 4 and τ 2(τ 3(1) + 1) = 4. Hence, from (9) and (10) we have σ 11 = 4,
σ 12 = τ 1,21 = 2 and σ 13 = τ 3,31 = 5.
Example 1 Consider a three-person game in which each player has one commodity
for sale. From (20) and (21) we get V3,1(ψ3) = ln(11), V3,2(ψ3) = ln(61/11), and




3) = σ 12 = 2 and σ 3,13 (ψˆ3) = σ 13 = 5. Thus, Player 1 will sell his commodity
at the stopping time σ 1,13 (ψˆ
3) = 4, i.e., at the time T4 = 3.99 and get the reward
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G4 = 2.96. Player 2 will sell his commodity at the stopping time σ 2,13 (ψˆ3) = 2, i.e.,
at the time T2 = 2.67 and get the reward G2 = 1.44. Player 3 will sell his commodity
at the stopping time σ 3,13 (ψˆ
3) = 5, i.e., at the time T5 = 5.83 and get the reward
G5 = 1.73.
Note that the i th player’s time of game’s end can be different from the optimal
time of selling of the i th commodity (for example σ 1,13 (ψˆ
3) = 4, since τ 1,31 = 2).
However, his expected reward is equal to the optimal expected reward which can be
obtained from selling the i th commodity, if we have i instead of i −1 commodities for
sale.
Note that from the beginning of the game to the end of the game by one of the
players, Players 1, 2, and 3 make the decisions using the threshold functions γ 1, γ 2,
γ 3, respectively [see (9) and (10)]. In our example, Player 2 finishes the game first
at stopping time τ 2(1) = 2. After this time, Player 1 keeps on making decisions
using threshold function γ 1 (because of priority). However, situation of Player 3
is changed. From now until the end of the game of Player 1 (i.e., to the stopping
time σ 1,13 (ψˆ




m) = σ 13 and from (10) on {τ 2(1) = τ 3(1) = 2} we have σ 13 = σ 32 ). In the
example, Player 1 stops next, so after this time Player 3 will make the decisions using
the threshold function γ 1 (because on {τ 2(1) = τ 3(1) = 2, τ 1(3) = τ 2(3) = 4}
we have σ 3,13 (ψˆ
m) = σ 51 = τ 1(5)). Note that during the whole game Player i uses
the strategy ψˆ3,i , i = 1, 2, 3. However, the strategy of Players 2 and 3 depends on
the decisions of players with higher priorities. Therefore, their threshold functions
can change during the game (in the example, Player 3 changes the threshold function
depending on decisions made by other players).
Example 2 Consider a two-person game. In the game, Player 1 has one commodity
for sale and Player 2 has two commodities for sale. Hence, from (20) and (21) we have




2) = σ 11 = 4, σ 2,12 (ψˆ2) = min{σ 12 , σ 13 } = 2 and σ 2,22 (ψˆ2) = σ 13 = 5. Player
1 will sell his commodity at the time T4 = 3.99 and get the reward G4 = 2.96. Player
2 will sell his commodities at times T2 = 2.67 and T5 = 5.83 and get the total reward
G2 + G5 = 3.17.
The numerous examples of multiple stopping problems in which functions γ i
have been obtained can be found in Sakaguchi (1972), Stadje (1985, 1987) (see also
Krasnosielska-Kobos and Ferenstein 2013) and Krasnosielska-Kobos (2015).
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